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5. The Democracies Between the Wars (1919-1939)
Abstract

At first glance, the events of World War I seemed to be a triumphant vindication of the spirit of 1848. It was
the leading democratic great powers - Britain, France, and the United States - who had emerged the victors. In
the political reconstruction of Europe, republics had replaces many monarchies. West of Russia, new and
apparently democratic constitutions were established in Germany, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Yet the sad truth was that by the outbreak of World War II
in 1939 the majority of the once democratic states of central and eastern Europe had been forcibly annexed by
stronger neighbors, or had severely curtailed their democracy, or had lost it outright. [excerpt]
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The Democracies between the Wars (1919-1939)

At f i vigt glance. the events of World War 1 seemed to be a
triumphant vindicatjon .oT~the "sj?jrit of 1848^
It was the~Tead^
in£L fifimrrat-j r
pniirV^" -- "Britai"n, France, and the United'
"^ates — who had emeryed th^ y-j rtn-rs
In the political recon
struction of Europe, republics had T-pplarfari many monarchies.
West of Russia, N^W
apparently dpmoci^ic congrrrtrrrrrn^ WPTP
fistahl 1 shed in Germany, Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithu
ania, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Yet the
sad truth was that by the outbreak of World War II in 1939 the
majority of the once democratic states of centraT and easteriT^
Europe had been forcitoly"
severe!y curtai 1 e'H'Their democracyj,,,,or had lost it outrigTiTT^
After admitting that unique factors were operative in each
case, one can recognize certain common weaknesses in central and
eastern F.in;^ean demnr-raf^y which help to explain its VUlne~faTjllj,lj^:^.(CjFirst^ Cop lew of these states were economically viable,
l^at i» Lo say, they seldom P0ssess¥a~"l:he ecnnnmir sti^ngth
necessary to support thP> appar-atna nf
«Ai f-p:overnment ,
especially wheQ.JjaxeaJ:ened bv avaririnnw nffighhr>r«a— For example,
the new republic of Austria had plenty of delightful mountain
scenery but not enough raw materials and industrial potential
to support its capital, Vienna, once the truly imperial center
of the Hapsburg Empire. The great depression of the 1930's
intensified existing economic difficulties, and added new ones.
^eco^) from the past these states inherited a legacy which
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handicapped _deBa£xa£y.
regimes had given the inhabTiants little or no experience in self-governments They had
nftc>n
education and iprinKfcrlal i y.atinnNow the old
ruling classes either opposed democracy outright or, bowing
before the fad of the times, gave it only lip service.
, not the least of these subversive legacies was
natioi^ism. ]^tteX-msm.9xije.S-.ja£™.tiije.,a!^.CfiJ0LiL^efeat_a^
seffgent"Tr.ss nf national territory were very much alive in,
for example, Germanjy and Bulgaria, Even among the victors,
virtually no nationaTist found the poistwar settlement com
pletely to his likingo
Again and again, when they believed
they had to choose between democracy and the attainment of some
nationalist goal, the people chose the latter. Apparently what
had really been the victor in 1918 was national independence,
of which democracy was not necessarily the concomitant,
( Fourth -iti an o-F
r.lQcq
tiontgythe stropp-^ol^
ideas, eit^ex: had never been
strong
Cjariiy hnfff^tari hv war revol 11 tioiji^ and 1 nf 1 atlon.
It is no coincidence that the most successful democracy in
eastern Europe was Czechoslovakia, which possessed a fairly
balanced economy and a middle class of some size.
C^iftl^_iri each of these states the regime faced problems
of lovai -t-v
unive
feeling^Eat, oom
what might, deiiiocrasy must bejmad^
Somecitizens
longed f or a restoration of the Hapsburgs*;" the Hohenzollerns,
or some other prewar regime.
t i o n a1 m i n o r i t i e s 1 Q o k e d . . o n ^
t(je frpnt.iex._tXL»^tJbueix,Jsl^^^
The relations of peas
ants and landlords were often embittered, as in Rumania, by
ethnic differences, Some idealists and -oppey^unis^s sougtit.,to
ally themselves with one of the new totalitarian systems
Fascisirri^aSsmj or Communism — which claimed to represent
'Hhe wave of'tie W
the loyalties of one's fellow
citizens are perennially open to question, democracy has tcugh
going indeed.
A"

^

.J

^

.00

la «

•« <-<• MM

<rVV Vk •«

H Ct *« VM

^

'V*

"V*

C! /

the atnallor g + Qtoa woon fomnH thoyngol vog morf^ or
less^'^flTng pawns in the great powers' stLXiiggle,. In the last

analysis, it was this which overthrew many of .them. Indeed,
after admitting the weaknesses of democracy in central and east
ern Europe, one might well marvel that it vorked as well as it
did.

In the United States, Scandinavia, Switzerland, the Low
Countries, Britain, and France democracy did survive. In the
1920's there were_ frequent attempts to get back to politics as
usual, the politi'cs of pre-1914 with the same parties, the same
"issues, and, in all too many cases, the same old faces. But the
pressure^gfJjiomesti c .a.nd_.ijalej.natAonal. ey.eii±a.jaa^.j^^
denie^ especially when the pall o£_ejcmiQmic depression .descended
in the^TSSS^,
The crisis of the depression years produced a serious
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institiit.i nna only

cates of t he.
Jaor X tariaiiiam.,,a£.lie"ft and-Ri-gh t a e em e d
under COntrol. In none of these states were the hard-won polit
ical institutions of democracy seriously curtailed. The—3ra*el
of the political party to which the voters in these countries
gave support varied widely. In the
the voters
turned in 1932 to the Democratxa-.^)arty, Franklin D. Roosevelt
(1882-1945) and the New Deal. Xn.Fxaiice, the victors were gov
ernments of the Centsx-^or, for a time, a Popular Front coali
tion of leftistparties supporting the republic. In Britain,
it was the Conservatives, masquerading as a multiparty National
government, which~dli^cted the country's affairs from 1931.
Wl^a-^is more striking than the differences in, label is the es
sential similarities of program in thesji .djimQCxaGi • Social
ists were~becoming more reformist, less revjnl utinnarv, ajyJ
often_j,t_^was diffi^
from 1 liberal—pro
ponent of thelyeIf
state. Conservatives were fairly P1ia,^i'.r Most of tiaem, what^er their party label, now advocated
the laissez-faire 1iberalism^avoredJay- maiiy. radicals .a-xeulSry

eaxiifix.; others lound it PosslbljeL.,lQ..,rec.QJiclle elements of the
welfare state with conservatism—

In general, following the precedent of that previous emer
gency, World War I, the democracies had recourse to planning^
F^ were \^lling to await the working pf„jjiy.-s©-lf«a'eg«lalJjig
featurB-3tr"tTie""eganoBiy7~A""wor^^
example of the new plan
ning techniques was the American Tennessee Valley Authority, a
government agency established to generate and sell electric
power, control floods, facilitate the navigation of rivers, and
combat poverty by mechanizing this backward region in the South.
In line with certain contemporary economic
pianning.„generally lavoLved increased ^Qvernmejxt--jBj>e.ndi.ng to
prime the economic pump. In France, public expenditure rose by
one-half in the decade after 1929. Businesses in difficulty,
like American farming, were salvaged by government subsidies.
Public works and other programs attempted to stimulate purchas
ing power. Social security schemes, like that enacted in the
United States in 1935, and labor legislation, like the fortyhour week in France, were introduced.
tO—carry economic planning,Into ,the international
sphere were not jaearly so .successful. Rather, the tendency was
for each state to attempt to steal prosperity from its neighbors
by such neomercantilistic devices as currency devaluation and
import quotas. Britain, the traditional free-trade state,
finally adopted protective tariffs during the Great Depression.
It could hardly be- fixpectexi-that-guch a^cxials-.- and so farreachlng--ar"l&gxslative program, would-.create, an era of politic
good feeling. Tempers ran high because the stakes'^ere"^
Many lost confidence in the automatic superiority of all demo
cratic institutions under all conditions. Legislatures and
voters temporarily abdicated many of their powers by granting
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the executive a limited right to govern by decree. Nevertheless. nojie of—the most prosperous and~the most
accustomed to democracy, strayjsd far from what was for them the
traditional form of government.
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